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TRIAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF ARKANSAS'S EXCEPTIONAL
TREATMENT OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE IN CRIMINAL
BENCH TRIALS. STRICKLAND V. STATE, 322 Ark. 312, 909 S.W.2d 318

(1995).
I. INTRODUCTION

An axiom of American jurisprudence
trial cannot form the basis of an appeal.'
procedural requisite as the contemporaneous
norms, however, exceptions to the general

is that issues not introduced at
Most jurisdictions refer to this
objection rule. Like many legal
rule exist. The most common

exception 2allows a new issue to be appealed if "plain error" occurred in the

trial court.
Although Arkansas does not possess a codified "plain error" exception
per se, it generally adheres to the contemporaneous objection rule,3 and
allows exceptions.' In Strickland v. State,5 the Arkansas Supreme Court
attempted to articulate an appropriate justification for allowing such an
exception in criminal bench trial appeals." This note uses the facts and the
court's reasoning in Strickland as a backdrop for analyzing Arkansas
criminal appellate procedure. The scope of the note will be limited to
defense appeals that challenge the prosecution's sufficiency of evidence and
1. Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions
Not Properly Raised and Preserved- PartI, 7 Wis. L. REV. 91, 92 (1932).
2. In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the United States Supreme Court
explained "plain error" as error that clearly or obviously affects the defendant's substantial
rights. Id. at 1777. The Olano Court identified three factors that must be considered in any
plain error analysis. (1) There must be "error." "Deviation from a legal rule is 'error' unless
the rule has been waived." Id. at 732-33. (2) The error must be "plain.. ...Plain' is
synonymous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious."' Id. at 734. (3) The error in question
must "affec[t] substantial rights." This usually involves the defendant showing or
demonstrating prejudice. Id.at 1777-78. Also, rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that "plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
3. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.24. See also Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814
(1994); Withers v. State, 308 Ark. 507, 825 S.W.2d 819 (1992); Christina D. Ferguson, Note,
Pharo v. State: Plain Error by Any Other Name, 44 ARK. L. REV. 779, 802-03 (1991)
(recommending amending rule 36.24 to eliminate discretionary treatment of trial court
appeals).
4. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.24. This casenote does not address appeals based on trial court
violations of a party's constitutional right to a trial by jury. Appeals based on these
violations are excepted from the contemporaneous objection rule. Grinning v. City of Pine
Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 50, 907 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1995). Also, for a discussion on special
contemporaneous objection rules regarding preliminary motions, see Catherine M. Young,
Comment, Should a Motion in Limine or Similar PreliminaryMotion Made in the Federal
Court System Preserve Erroron Appeal Without a Contemporaneous Objection?, 79 KY. L.J.
177 (1990-1991).
5. 322 Ark. 312, 909 S.W.2d 318 (1995).
6. Id. at 318, 909 S.W.2d at 321.
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to the jury/bench trial dichotomy that plagued the Strickland court. The
conclusion proposes amending the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure to
discontinue disparate treatment of sufficiency of evidence appeals arising
from criminal bench trial convictions.
II. FACTS
On January 21, 1993, twelve-year-old Jackie Olivio stayed home from
school because of inclimate weather.7 Jackie's 43-year-old stepfather,
Kenneth Strickland, drove his wife to work, and upon returning home, asked
Jackie to come to his room and lie down with him. After the child agreed,
Strickland placed his arm around her shoulder and began fondling her breast
for five to ten minutes.9 Jackie began crying, told Strickland to stop, and
tried to get up but was held back.'" Strickland asked the child how badly
she wanted him to stop." When she told him she wanted to leave, he
allowed her to return to her room. 2
Although Jackie did not mention the incident to her mother, she told
her friend, Karis Rankin, on the school bus the next day. 13 Karis informed
her mother, Lorraine Burris, who relayed the information to Jackie's
school.' 4 Based on the school's advice, Ms. Burris contacted the authorities
who apprehended Strickland. 5
Strickland waived his right to a jury trial and, at the ensuing bench
trial, based his sole defense on the claim that his stepdaughter fabricated the
story because of jealousy. 6 Other than his attack on the credibility of the
child's testimony, however, Strickland presented no other reasons why he
felt the State's evidence was insufficient for conviction. 7

7. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 10, Strickland v. State, 322 Ark. 312, 909
S.W.2d 318 (1995)(No. 94-879).
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 9-10.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10, 13.
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Stricdand,322 Ark. at 314, 909 S.W.2d at 319.
17. Id.
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The trial court found Strickland guilty of first degree sexual abuse.'"
The judge concurred with the prosecutor that the case consisted of a secret
crime with no physical evidence or witnesses to confirm or refute the
charges. 9 The judge believed that secret crime cases inevitably turn on
credibility and in his opinion, Jackie was the more credible party.20
On appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Strickland alleged that the
State's evidence insufficiently supported his conviction.2' Strickland's
appeal did not challenge the trial court's finding that the child's testimony
was credible. Instead, he specifically asserted that the State failed to prove
two of the elements required for conviction.2 2 Strickland claimed that the
State failed to prove that he fondled his stepdaughter's breast and, assuming
that he did commit the act, the State failed to prove that he fondled the child
for sexual gratification.' The State argued that Arkansas's contemporaneous
objection rule commanded dismissal of Strickland's appeal because it was
based on novel issues not raised in the trial court. 4
The Arkansas Supreme Court chose to intervene to clarify whether a
bench trial defendant must raise the particulars of his claim of insufficient
evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal.25 The majority found that
Strickland possessed the ability to appeal, but also found that the State
provided sufficient proof to affirm Strickland's conviction.26 Consequently,
the court chose to maintain a distinction between the application of the
contemporaneous objection rule in bench trials and in jury trials.2 7
III. BACKGROUND
The contemporaneous objection rule requires specific and timely
objection in the trial court to preserve an issue for appeal.2 Timely means
18. Supplemental Abstract and Brief of Appellee at 6, Stricdand v. State, 322 Ark. 312,
909 S.W.2d 318 (1995) (No. 94-879). The offense results when someone 18 years or older
engages in sexual contact with someone less than 14 years old who is not a spouse. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-108(a)(3)(Michie 1993). Sexual contact includes "any act of sexual
gratification involving the touching [of] ... the breast of a female." ARK. CODE ANN. § 514-101(8)(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995).
19. Appellee's Supplemental Abstract and Brief at 2-3, Strickland (No. 94-879).
20. Id. at SA2.
21. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 314, 909 S.W.2d at 319.
22. Id. at 319, 909 S.W.2d at 321-22.
23. Supplemental Abstract and Brief of Appellee at 1, Strickland (No. 94-879).
24. Id. at 2-4.
25. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 313, 909 S.W.2d at 318.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 317-18, 909 S.W.2d at 320-21.
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (6th ed. 1990).
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an objection must be made at the first opportunity29 and specificity requires
the trial court be given an opportunity to correct the asserted error.3" The
court in Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.3 1 advanced three justifications for adhering to this procedural formality: (1) it encourages correction
and avoidance of issues at the trial court level; (2) it prevents the adverse
party from being prejudiced by the other party's failure to object at trial; and
(3) it facilitates the formation of a complete trial court record which permits
full appellate review of an issue.32
Arkansas's application of the contemporaneous objection rule is
confusing and non-uniform. Although the rule is generally followed,3 3
courts employ different standards depending on the nature of the appeal.
For example, sufficiency of evidence appeals of jury decisions are treated
differently than bench trial decisions. Furthermore, Arkansas courts have
reached incompatible results regarding the requisites necessary to satisfy the
rule's timeliness and specificity elements within the province of a jury or
bench trial. The remainder of this section will review Arkansas's application of the contemporaneous objection rule and summarize the state of the
law in sister jurisdictions.
A. Arkansas's Application of the Contemporaneous Objection Standard
in Sufficiency of Evidence Appeals
1. Civil Appeals of Jury Trials
In order to appeal an adversarial party's evidence as insufficient,
Arkansas requires the appellant in a jury trial to either move for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, or move for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.34 Rule 50(e) mirrors the contemporaneous
objection rule and Arkansas courts consistently require that its requisites be
met to preserve a sufficiency of evidence appeal in a civil jury trial.35
29. Dillard v. State, 20 Ark. App. 35, 40, 723 S.W.2d 373, 376 (1987).
30. Clark v. State, 26 Ark. App. 268, 271, 764 S.W.2d 458, 460 (1989).
31. 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
32. Id. at 457 n. 1. For a critical analysis of these justifications, see Rhett R.
Dennerline, Note, PushingAside The GeneralRule In Order To Raise New Issues On Appeal,
64 IND. L.J. 985, 986 (1989).
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. ARK. R. Civ. P. 50(e). A directed verdict motion is analogous to a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence. Galvin v. State, 323 Ark. 125, 127, 912 S.W.2d 932, 933 (1996).
In 1983, rule 50 was amended to "no longer allow the sufficiency of the evidence to be
challenged by a motion for a new trial ..
" In re Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, 279 Ark. 470, 471, 651 S.W.2d 63, 63 (1983).
35. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 319 Ark. 54, 58-59, 889 S.W.2d 750, 752 (1994)
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2. Civil Appeals of Non-Jury Trials
The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedurestate that a party in a non-jury
trial may challenge the sufficiency of evidence at the conclusion of the
opponent's evidence or at the close of all of the evidence.36 Because of the
word "may," the requirement appears to be discretionary.3 7 Arkansas first
addressed the issue in Bass v. Koller." Although the Bass court allowed an
appeal of an issue not raised during the bench trial, it failed to base the
decision on a discretionary interpretation of rule 50(a).39 Instead, the court
held that because rule 50(e) specifically applies to jury trials, it implies
exclusion of cases tried without a jury.40 However, the court's opinion
omitted any justification for excepting a bench trial appeal from the
contemporaneous objection rule.4'
Likewise, in Sipes v. Munro,42 the court held that because rule 50(e)
applies only to jury trials, it is unnecessary to move for a directed verdict
in a bench trial to test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal. 43 Again,
however, the Sipes holding merely restated the black letter rule without
offering any insight into the basis for the bench trial exception.'

(stating that sufficiency of the evidence was preserved by making a directed verdict motion
at the end of appellee's case and renewing it at the close of all the evidence); Willson Safety
Prods. v. Eschenbrenner, 302 Ark. 228, 232-33, 788 S.W.2d 729, 732-33 (1990)(holding that
a manufacturer waived its ability to appeal insufficiency of the jury's products liability
judgment because it failed to renew its directed verdict motion at the conclusion of all
evidence); City of Helena v. Chrestman, 17 Ark. App. 235, 236, 707 S.W.2d 338, 338
(1986)(refusing to address appellant's argument because it did not move for a directed verdict
or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
36. ARK. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Rule 50(a) essentially copies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(a). Id. (Reporter's Notes). See also Jones v. Jones, 27 Ark. App. 297, 301, 770 S.W.2d
174, 176 (1989); Harpole v. Harpole, 10 Ark. App. 298, 304, 664 S.W.2d 480, 483 (1984).
37. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 318, 909 S.W.2d at 321. The court stated:
Rule 50(a) thus provides a means of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
in a bench trial ....
Use of the motion is obviously discretionary rather than
mandatory because the rule provides that a party "may" make such a motion. The
fact that the motion is optional keeps the use of it from being a requirement for
preservation of the sufficiency issue for appeal.
Id.
38. 276 Ark. 93, 96, 632 S.W.2d 410, 412 (1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. 287 Ark. 244, 697 S.W.2d 905 (1985).
43. Id. at 246, 697 S.W.2d at 906.
44. Id.
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3. Criminal Appeals of Jury Trials
Prior to Arkansas's adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
general directed verdict motion sufficiently apprised the trial court of the
prosecution's insufficient evidence.4 5 With the adoption of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1976,46 however, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
repeatedly required the defendant to specifically apprise the trial court of the
basis for the motion.47 The rule states that a criminal defendant in a jury
trial waives any opportunity to appeal the sufficiency of evidence when he
fails to move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the prosecution's
evidence and at the close of the case.4" In Franklin v. State,49 the court
reiterated that the motion must also be sufficiently specific to apprise the
trial court of the ground for the motion.50 The reasoning is that when
specific grounds are stated and the absent proof identified, the trial court can
sustain the motion or allow the State to supply the missing proof.5
4. Criminal Appeals of Non-Jury Trials
Although Criminal Rule 36.21(b), like Civil Rule 50(e), has consistently applied to jury trial appeals, the Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to
45. Walker v. State, 318 Ark. 107, 108, 883 S.W.2d 831, 831-32 (1994).
46. ARK. R. CpiM. P. 1.7(d).
47. Brown v. State, 316 Ark. 724, 727, 875 S.W.2d 828, 830 (1994)(holding defendant's
appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him a directed verdict on felony counts
was waived because specific arguments were not raised below); Hickson v. State, 312 Ark.
171, 174, 847 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1993) (holding defendant's sufficiency of the evidence
challenge need not be reviewed because defendant moved for a directed verdict on a capital
felony murder charge; however, the jury acquitted him of this charge and found him guilty
of second degree murder); Middleton v. State, 311 Ark. 307, 308-09, 842 S.W.2d 434, 435
(1992)(holding appellant waived right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by failing
to move for a directed verdict at the close of the state's case, and also because defendant
merely made "the usual motions" instead of apprising the trial court of the specifics of his
claim at the close of all evidence); See also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.2 1(b). Rule 36.21 has been
amended, renumbered as Rule 33.1, and retitled "Motions for Directed Verdict and Special
Procedures During Jury Trial." ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.1.
48. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.21.
49. No. CACR94-1002, 1995 WL 758831 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1995) (not designated
for publication).
50. Id. at *1. See also Helton v. State, 320 Ark. 352, 354, 896 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1995)
(denying appeal based on the sufficiency of the evidence because the defendant's directed
verdict motion was too general); Jones v. State, 318 Ark. 704, 712, 889 S.W.2d 706, 709-10
(1994) (holding that defendant's directed verdict motion was too general to support a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence); Walker, 318 Ark. at 107-09, 883 S.W.2d at
831-32.
51. Walker, 318 Ark. at 109, 883 S.W.2d at 832.
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justify why it should not equally apply to bench trials. 2 In Collins v.
State,53 for example, Collins appealed that the inapplicability of rule
36.21(b) to non-jury trials lacked a rational basis.5 4 Instead of addressing
the claim, however, the court disposed of the argument as merely
conclusory 5
Because no Arkansas Criminal Rule corresponds to Civil Rule 50(a),
the court possesses even greater flexibility to establish contemporaneous
objection requirements in criminal bench trials. Because of this flexibility
the court has taken inconsistent positions. However, one benefit of this
flexibility has been the emergence of a justification for maintaining the
contemporaneous objection exception for bench trials.
In Greer v. State,56 the court chose not to exempt bench trials from the
contemporaneous objection rule.57 Instead, the court required the defendant
to move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's evidence to
preserve the sufficiency of evidence issue. In Igwe v. State,59 however, the
court overruled Greer by holding that a criminal defendant in a bench trial
is not required to move for a directed verdict to preserve the sufficiency of
evidence for appeal.' The court's justification was that in a bench trial, a
directed verdict motion automatically exists because the judge's main
purpose is to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence in reaching a decision.6"
However, less than two years later, Stricklin v. State62 reversed Igwe
and reaffirmed the Greer holding. Stricklin was convicted of seven counts
of rape of his two minor daughters63 and appealed on grounds different from
those raised at trial.' The court denied Stricklin any appeal on issues not
first introduced in the trial court.65

52. See Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992); Cole v. State, 307 Ark. 41,
818 S.W.2d 573 (1991); Crow v. State, 306 Ark. 411, 814 S.W.2d 909 (1991); Andrews v.
State, 305 Ark. 262, 807 S.W.2d 917 (1991).
53. 308 Ark. 536, 826 S.W.2d 231 (1992).
54. Id. at 538, 826 S.W.2d at 232-33.
55. Id.
56. 310 Ark. 522, 837 S.W.2d 884 (1992).
57. Id. at 524, 832 S.W.2d at 885.
58. Id.
59. 312 Ark. 220, 849 S.W.2d 462 (1993).
60. Id. at 224, 849 S.W.2d at 464.
61. Id.
62. 318 Ark. 36, 883 S.W.2d 465 (1994). This case is not to be confused with the title
case, Strickland v. State, 322 Ark. 312, 909 S.W.2d 318 (1995).
63. Stricklin, 318 Ark. at 37, 883 S.W.2d at 465.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 38, 883 S.W.2d at 466.
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Igwe and Stricklin are irreconcilable. 66 Under Igwe, a criminal
defendant can appeal sufficiency of evidence issues not raised in the bench
trial by not moving for a directed verdict. 67 Under Stricklin, the same
defendant moving for a directed verdict becomes bound to those issues
included in the motion.6 8
5. CriminalAppeals of Life Imprisonment or Death Sentence
Convictions
The Arkansas Rules of CriminalAppellate Procedurepurport to create
a contemporaneous objection exception for life imprisonment or death
sentence convictions. 69 The rule states that if a sentence for life imprisonment or death is imposed, the entire record shall be reviewed for errors
prejudicial to the appellant's rights.7 ° Although the language appears to
allow the introduction of novel appeals, Arkansas courts have not interpreted
the rule consistently.
For example, in Withers v. State,7 the defendant was convicted of
possession of cocaine and sentenced to life in prison as a habitual offender.72
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that Rule 16 presupposes that the
defendant made a contemporaneous objection at trial to preserve the
sufficiency of evidence for appellate review.7 3
In Remeta v. State,74 the defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.75 The court disallowed Remeta's sufficiency of evidence
appeal despite his directed verdict motion at the close of the State's case.76
66. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 322, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Corbin, J., concurring).
67. Igwe, 312 Ark. at 221, 849 S.W.2d at 462.
68. Stricklin, 318 Ark. at 38, 883 S.W.2d at 466.
69. In re Adoption of Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure, 900 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Ark.
1995) (former Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.24 is now found at rule 16); see also
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2725 (Supp. 1973); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 11(f); ARK. R. EvID. 103(d).
70. In re Adoption of Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure, 900 S.W.2d at 568.
71. 308 Ark. 507, 825 S.W.2d 819 (1992).
72. Id. at 508, 825 S.W.2d at 820.
73. Id. at 511, 825 S.W.2d at 821; see also Ballew v. State, 21 Ark. App. 215, 216, 731
S.W.2d 222, 222 (1987) (holding defendant's appeal based on insufficient evidence waived
because he failed to move for a directed verdict or otherwise preserve the issue for appeal);
Fretwell v. State, 289 Ark. 91, 708 S.W.2d 630 (1986)(holding when life is at stake, the
court will make its own examination of the record, but will not consider a matter not
objected to at trial); Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980)(holding
defendant's argument for reversal will not be considered absent an appropriate objection at
trial).
74. 300 Ark. 92, 777 S.W.2d 833 (1989).
75. Id. at 94, 777 S.W.2d at 834.
76. Id. at 96-97, 777 S.W.2d at 835.
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The court stated that because Remeta did not move for a directed'verdict at
the close of all the evidence pursuant to Criminal Rule of Procedure
36.21(b), he waived his right to appeal."
The court decided otherwise in Houston v. State,7" however, where the
defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to
a 99 year term.7 9 The defendant made a motion for a directed verdict at the
close of the state's case but not at the close of the trial.8" Although the
court initially noted that noncompliance with Rule 36.21(b) barred an appeal
on the sufficiency of evidence, it held that a renewal of the motion would
have been to no avail because the evidence was more than sufficient to
show premeditation and to prove that the victim was not the aggressor.8
The Houston holding appears to allow a waiver of rule 36.21(b) if, in the
court's opinion, the sufficiency of evidence is heavily tilted against the
defendant.8 2
B. Synopsis of The General State of The Law in Federal and Sister State
Jurisdictions
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), "Motion Before Submission
to Jury," states that by motion of a defendant or by the court's own motion,
a judgment of acquittal shall be ordered if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain the defendant's conviction. 3 United States v. Pitts"4 interpreted the
rule in a bench trial setting. Pitts, convicted of bank robbery, appealed the
government's evidence as insufficient to support a finding of mental
competence beyond reasonable doubt.8 6 Pitts made a rule 29 motion at the
end of the government's case, but did not renew the motion at the close of
all the evidence.87 The court stated that in a jury trial, a failure to renew
waives the initial motion and waives the issue for appeal unless there is a

77. Id.
78. 299 Ark. 7, 771 S.W.2d 16 (1989).
79. Id. at 9, 771 S.W.2d 17.
80. Id. at 11-12, 771 S.W.2d at 19.
81. Id.
82. But see Collins, 308 Ark. at 538, 826 S.W.2d at 232 (stating that the isolated
Houston decision was not a material deviation from the usual adherence to rule 36.21, and
"[ifn no case... [has] a meritorious argument as to sufficiency of the evidence prevail[ed]
over the defendant's failure to raise it in the trial court.").
83. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
84. 428 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 535.
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id. at 535.
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"manifest miscarriage of justice" or "plain error., 88 The court stated that the
waiver does not apply to non-jury cases, however, because the defendant's
not guilty plea suffices as a motion for acquittal.8
Pitts was cited and further elaborated upon in Maine v. Morgan.90
Morgan appealed his bench trial conviction for gross sexual misconduct
because the chief witness's testimony insufficiently proved guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.9' The court stated that contemporaneous objection
requirements provide a jury trial defendant protection against an improper
or irrational verdict, but are not necessary in a bench trial. 9 The court
justified the holding by concluding that a bench trial defendant automatically
motions for acquittal by pleading not guilty, waiving his right to a jury, and
proceeding through trial. 93
Other states agree with the Pitts and Morgan theory of allowing a
bench trial appeal of novel issues. For example, in In re JN.H.,94 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that the general rule requiring
a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence is not
controlling in a bench trial. 95 Likewise, Illinois.v. Crowder96 noted that a
post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve the sufficiency of evidence
issue for appeal in a bench trial.97
There is an equal balance of state courts, however, that strictly adhere
to the contemporaneous objection rule unless "plain error" was committed
in the trial court. In People v. Carlos Santo,98 the New York Court of
Appeals held that there was no practical reason why the contemporaneous
objection requirement should not equally apply to jury and non-jury trials. 9
In Howard v. Commonwealth of Virginia,'00 a defendant convicted of
88. Id.

89. Id. See also 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
§ 469 (2d ed. 1982).

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

CRIMINAL

90. 379 A.2d 728 (Me. 1977).
91. Id. at 729.
92. Id. at 729-30.
93. Id. at 730.
94. 293 A.2d 878 (D.C.1972).
95. Id. at 880.
96. 529 N.E.2d 83 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).
97. Id. at 85. See also Couser v.Maryland, 356 A.2d 612, 615 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1976)(stating that a motion for judgment of acquittal would be superfluous in a bench trial
because the trial court's clear ruling of guilt indicated that there was sufficient evidence to
deny the motion); Beck v. Alaska, 408 P.2d 996, 998 (Alaska 1965)(finding that a defendant
in a bench trial did not waive right to question the sufficiency of evidence by failing to move
for judgment of acquittal at close of either the state's case or close of all the evidence).
98. 658 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1995).
99. Id. at 1042.
100. 465 S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
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attempted rape appealed the sufficiency of the state's evidence.1"' The court
held that the issue may be preserved in a bench trial if the defendant makes
"a motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence, present[s] an
appropriate argument in summation, or make[s] a motion to set aside the
verdict."'0 2 In Fortune v. Commonwealth of Virginia,"3 the Virginia Court
of Appeals added that the contemporaneous objection rule is satisfied if the
defendant's closing argument adequately provides the trial court an
opportunity to consider the issue and take corrective action."
In St. Louis County v. McClune, °5 the Missouri Court of Appeals stated
that issues not introduced in the trial court are not appealable in jury or nonjury trials." 6 Finally, in North Dakota v. Timm,'0° the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a defendant must challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence either by motion for an advised verdict or by a motion for a new
trial to preserve an issue for appeal." 8 The court noted that the word
"verdict" includes a judge's findings in a bench trial and jury verdicts.'0 9
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Strickland majority rested its opinion on a literal interpretation of
Rule 36.21(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure."' Justice
Newbem, writing for the court, initially noted that the rule only applies in
a jury trial."' However, the State's position was that the court previously
"required criminal defendants at bench trials to move for a 'directed verdict'
to preserve the sufficiency of evidence issue for appeal.""112 The State cited
Igwe and Stricklin as support." 3 The State interpreted the question
presented in Igwe as narrowly limited to whether a criminal defendant in a4
bench trial must renew a directed verdict motion at the close of the trial. "
Accordingly, the State suggested that Igwe did not modify the general
requirement that a criminal defendant must challenge the sufficiency of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 144.
416 S.E.2d 25 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 27.
762 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 92.
146 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1966).
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
See Strickland v. State, 322 Ark. 312, 314-16, 909 S.W.2d 318, 319-20 (1995).
Strickland, 322 Ark. at 315, 909 S.W.2d at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316, 909 S.W.2d at 320.
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evidence at some point in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal." 5
The court disposed of this argument as inconsistent with Igwe's rationale. "6
The court reasserted Igwe's two main propositions." 7 First, the court
restated that any motivation to apply 36.21(b) to bench trials is overcome
by the statute's explicit reference to jury trials."' Second, the court noted
that while it may be prudent to keep a case from a jury when the evidence
is obviously insufficient to support conviction, the justification does not
exist in a bench trial.' 9 The court reasoned that because the judge in a
bench trial is sufficiently aware of the evidence and the elements of the
2
crime being tried, a directed verdict motion is unnecessary. 1
The State relied on Stricklin for authority that a contemporaneous
objection is required in a bench trial to preserve an appeal.' 2 ' Instead of
applying the Stricklin precedent, however, the court decided to overrule
Stricklin to the extent that it required a motion to dismiss in a bench trial."
Consequently, a criminal defendant in a bench trial need not apprise the trial
court of the particulars of why
the State's evidence is insufficient in order
23
to raise the issue on appeal.
In their concurring opinions, Justices Dudley, Glaze, and Corbin failed
to see the merits in distinguishing the procedural rules for appeals from
criminal defendants who waive their right to a jury trial and those who do
not. 24 Justice Dudley stated that the majority's holding was inconsistent
with the court's contemporaneous objection rule.' 25 Although Justice Dudley
conceded that the judge should be sufficiently aware of the evidence and the
elements of the crime in a bench trial, he stated two alternative
propositions. 126 Equitably, Justice Dudley believed the State's right to a fair
trial is prejudiced by not being informed of missing evidence and thus, not
having the opportunity to cure it in the trial court. 27 Also, Justice Dudley
noted that special judges, who do not regularly sit as trial judges, try
criminal cases in Arkansas.' 2 8 Pragmatically, because these judges may not
115.
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Id. at 316, 909 S.W.2d at 320.
Id. at 318, 909 S.W.2d at 321.
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Id. at 320-24, 909 S.W.2d at 322-24 (Dudley, Glaze, and Corbin, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 320, 909 S.W.2d at 322 (Dudley, J., concurring).
Id. at 320-21, 909 S.W.2d at 322-23 (Dudley, J., concurring).
Id. at 320, 909 S.W.2d at 322 (Dudley, J., concurring).
Id. at 320-21, 909 S.W.2d at 322-23 (Dudley, J., concurring).
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be familiar with the elements of multiple crimes, they should be provided
the specific grounds which the defendant claims as insufficient.'29
Justice Corbin, joined by Justice Glaze, disagreed with the majority
interpretation of Igwe and thus, did not see a discrepancy with Stricklin. 30
Justice Corbin limited Igwe such that once a defendant makes a directed
verdict motion in a bench trial, a renewal is not needed at the close of the
trial to preserve the sufficiency of evidence issue for appeal.'
Justice
Corbin felt the majority exceeded Igwe to the point that a criminal defendant
in a bench trial need not challenge the sufficiency of evidence issue at all
in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.'3 2 Moreover, Justice
Corbin shared Justice Dudley's concern that the majority's holding deprives
the State of the right to a fair trial by not providing an opportunity to supply
any missing evidence identified by the defendant.' 33
V. SIGNIFICANCE

It is not entirely clear whether Stricklandmeans a bench trial defendant
need not make a sufficiency of evidence challenge at all in the trial court to
preserve the issue for appeal. From a defense perspective, the Strickland
result is undoubtedly equitable because the State possesses the burden of
proof in a criminal trial."' 4 The argument proceeds that if the evidence is
insufficient, the defense should not be required to point to the specific areas
where the State went astray. Nevertheless, Strickland presents new pretrial
planning considerations for the defense because a jury trial waiver would be
more favorable should a conviction decision require a challenge to the
State's evidence.

129. Id. at 321, 909 S.W.2d at 322 (Dudley, J., concurring). Justice Dudley noted that
"[a]s a practical matter, a criminal bench trial frequently involves multiple crimes." Id.
(Dudley, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Dudley stated that the majority's ruling could
cause a defense attorney to unintentionally mislead the trial court, as counsel did in
Strickland. Id. at 321-22, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Dudley, J., concurring). Specifically,
Strickland's counsel moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the victim's testimony
lacked credibility, and the trial court focused its sole attention on this issue in convicting
Strickland. Id. (Dudley, J., concurring). Credibility, however, is not mentioned in
Strickland's appeal. Id. at 322, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Dudley, J., concurring). Instead,
Strickland argued that the State failed to prove to the trial court that he touched the child for
sexual gratification. Id. (Dudley, J., concurring).
130. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 323, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Corbin, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 323, 909 S.W.2d at 324 (Corbin, J., concurring).
132. Id. (Corbin, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Corbin, J., concurring).
134. Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden Qfroof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 647,
656 (1994).
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Alternatively, Strickland handicaps the State by allowing a conviction
appeal and potential acquittal on technicalities that were never introduced to
the trial court.' 35 Furthermore, although the defense is afforded this luxury
in a bench trial, the State is not given equal opportunity
to appeal a bench
36
trial acquittal because of double jeopardy safeguards.1
The justifications provided by the Strickland majority can be logically
countered. The majority concluded that the clear language of Rule 36.21
precluded a contrary holding. 37 However, this is contradictory to the
judicial obligation of statutory interpretation.' 38 This is especially true when
statutory language is ambiguous. 139 Rule 36.21(b) clearly enumerates its
applicability to jury trials, but makes no reference to bench trials. 4 ' The
court used a language construction cannon to reason that because the rule
specifically referenced jury trials, it implicitly did not apply to bench
trials.'
Because no other criminal procedure rule applies to bench trials,
however, it seems equally logical that the court could have interpreted the
rule to equally apply to both jury and bench trials.
The Strickland majority also noted that while the contemporaneous
42
objection rule is appropriate in jury trials as a matter of judicial economy,
the same is not true of bench trials. On further review, however, the
Strickland decision may promote judicial inefficiency because a bench trial
adjudication will be squandered if an 3appellate decision turns on an issue
completely foreign to the trial court. 11

135. Strickland,322 Ark. at 321-22, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Dudley, J., concurring). Justice
Dudley provided the following hypothetical:
[A]s the rule now stands, the deputy prosecutor may have forgotten to ask the
question about value [of a stolen item] and, at the trial, no one realized it, and
then months later while examining the transcript, the defense attorney discovers
the defect in one of the multiple counts. Under the present rule, the attorney
could argue the defect for the first time on appeal. The defendant will then go
free on that count because of a defect caused by our rule and an unjust result will
have been reached.
Id. at 321, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Dudley, J., concurring).
136. Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When is an
Acquittal not an Acquittal?, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953, 954 (Fall 1995).
137. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 317, 909 S.W.2d at 320.
138. Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting The FederalRules Of Evidence: The Use and Abuse
of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1283, 1284-87 (1995).
139. For an interesting discussion of statutory interpretation versus strict reliance on plain
meaning, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, PlainMeaning: Justice Scalia"sJurisprudenceOf Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994).
140. ARK. R. CRAM. P. 36.21(b).
141. Strickland, 322 Ark. at 317, 909 S.W.2d at 320-21.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 323-24, 909 S.W.2d at 324 (Corbin, J., concurring).

1997]

TRIAL PROCEDURE

Strickland may have gone too far because the benefits of requiring a
contemporaneous objection to preserve a bench trial appeal outweigh the
minimal burden placed on a defendant to do so. Instead of quieting
contemporary criticism regarding pro-defense legal safeguards, Strickland
sounds the alarm Caveat Querens (let the plaintiff beware).
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Arkansas Supreme Court amend
Rule 36.21(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure to eliminate
waiver of the contemporaneous objection rule in a criminal bench trial.'"
This amendment would require the defendant to notify the trial court of the
particular reasons why the State's evidence is insufficient in order to
preserve the issue for appeal. In addition to curing the equity concerns
addressed by the concurring justices in Strickland,'45 this approach will add
uniformity and predictability to a confusing area of Arkansas law.
Dale D. Smith

144. Id. at 322, 909 S.W.2d at 323 (Dudley, J., concurring).
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